In Vino Veritas: The Economics of Drinking by Jan Heufer
In Vino Veritas:









Ruhr Economic Papers 
Published by
Ruhr-Universität Bochum (RUB), Department of Economics
Universitätsstr. 150, 44801 Bochum, Germany
Technische Universität Dortmund, Department of Economic and Social Sciences
Vogelpothsweg 87, 44227 Dortmund, Germany
Universität Duisburg-Essen, Department of Economics
Universitätsstr. 12, 45117 Essen, Germany
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
Hohenzollernstr. 1-3, 45128 Essen, Germany
Editors 
Prof. Dr. Thomas K. Bauer
RUB, Department of Economics, Empirical Economics
Phone: +49 (0) 234/3 22 83 41, e-mail: thomas.bauer@rub.de
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Leininger
Technische Universität Dortmund, Department of Economic and Social Sciences
Economics – Microeconomics
Phone: +49 (0) 231/7 55-3297, email: W.Leininger@wiso.uni-dortmund.de
Prof. Dr. Volker Clausen
University of Duisburg-Essen, Department of Economics
International Economics
Phone: +49 (0) 201/1 83-3655, e-mail: vclausen@vwl.uni-due.de
Prof. Dr. Christoph M. Schmidt
RWI, Phone: +49 (0) 201/81 49-227, e-mail: christoph.schmidt@rwi-essen.de
Editorial Oﬃ   ce 
Joachim Schmidt
RWI, Phone: +49 (0) 201/81 49-292, e-mail: joachim.schmidt@rwi-essen.de
Ruhr Economic Papers #158 
Responsible Editor: Wolfgang Leininger
All rights reserved. Bochum, Dortmund, Duisburg, Essen, Germany, 2009
ISSN 1864-4872 (online) – ISBN 978-3-86788-177-7
The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to 
stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the 
authors’ own opinions and do not necessarily reﬂ  ect those of the editors.Ruhr Economic Papers #158
Jan Heufer
In Vino Veritas:




in Economics ECONRuhr Economic Papers #124
Bibliograﬁ  sche Informationen 
der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek
Die Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der deutschen 





The Economics of Drinking
Abstract
It is argued that drug consumption, most commonly alcohol drinking, can be a tech-
nology to give up some control over one’s actions and words. It can be employed by 
trustworthy players to reveal their type. Similarly alcohol can function as a “social 
lubricant” and faciliate type revelation in conversations. It is shown that both sepa-
rating and pooling equilibria can exist; as opposed to the classic results in the litera-
ture, a pooling equilibrium is still informative. Drugs which allow a gradual loss of 
control by appropriate doses and for which moderate consumption is not addictive 
are particularly suitable because the consumption can be easily observed and recipro-
cated and is unlikely to occur out of the social context. There is a tradeoﬀ   between the 
eﬃ   ciency gains due to the signaling eﬀ  ect and the loss of productivity associated with 
intoxication. Long run evolutionary equilibria of the type distribution are considered. 
If coordination on an exclusive technology is eﬃ   cient, social norms or laws can raise 
eﬃ   ciency by legalizing only one drug.
JEL Classiﬁ  cation: C72, D82
Keywords: Asymmetric Information, Drinking, Drug Consumption, Signaling, Social 
Norms
December 2009
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advisor Wolfgang Leininger for his support and comments. Thanks to Jörg Franke and Yiquan 
Gu for helpful comments and discussions. Views expressed represent exclusively the author’s 
own opinions. – All correspondence to Jan Heufer, TU Dortmund, Department of Economics and 
Social Science, 44221 Dortmund, Germany, e-mail: jan.heufer@tu-dortmund.de.“ Id o n ’ tt r u s tam a nw h od o e s n ’ td r i n k...you don’t know what he’s up to.”
–Szwed (1966), quoting an anonymous Newfoundlander
1 introduction
Social drinking is widespread in many areas of the world, and there is at least anecdotal
evidence that participation in moderate consumption within a social context can be
beneficial for individuals.1 It is argued in this paper that social drug consumption, in
particular alcohol drinking, can be used directly to partially reveal a player’s personality,
in particular his trustworthiness, and, in a separating equilibrium, can serve as a credible
signal. Adrugisthoughtofasatechnologywhichcanbeusedtovoluntarilygiveupsome
degree of control over one’s action and words; if this consumption takes place within a
social context both the consumption itself and the drug-induced behavior is observable.
W h i l et h er e v e l a t i o no ft r u t ha ft e rt h ec o n s u m p t i o no fa l c o h o li sp r o v e r b i a li nm a n y
cultures, it suffices for the idea of this paper that the observation of alcohol-induced
b e h a v i o rc a nb eu s e dt ob e t t e re s t i m a t eap e r s o n ’ sp e r s o n a l i t yt y p e ,o rt h a ta l c o h o la s
a “social lubricant” heightens social interaction.2 If alcohol can be used to give others
better information about one’s personality, the social consumption of alcohol can benefit
t h o s ew h ow o u l dl i k et oh o n e s t l yr e v e a lt h e i rt y p e .F o re x a m p l e ,i fp l a y e r sp l a yag a m eo f
trust, a trustworthy person might suffer a subjective disutility from exploiting trust and
therefore choose to reward trust. If his trustworthiness is common knowledge, this player
would be trusted by others if this leads to a higher payoff for both. If his trustworthiness
is not observable, other players might not be willing to take the risk of trusting him. The
trustworthy player, therefore, has an incentive to employ alcohol in order to credibly
reveal information about himself. A non-trustworthy player may not be willing to imitate
t h eb e h a v i o ro ft h et r u s t w o r t h yp l a y e r s . 3
In general, many different drugs are potential signals. If intoxication is associated
with a loss of productivity, e.g. a reduction in the pie which is to be split up, there is a
natural trade off between the gains due to revelation of trustworthiness and the decrease
in productivity. If the drug is highly addictive, it would also be used out of the social
c o n t e x t ,au s ew h i c hi so n l yu n p r o d u c t i v e .
Besides being useful to obtain a better estimate of someone’s type, a suitable drug
should therefore i) be not addictive for moderate consumption, ii) have only short term
1History is also rich in examples of alcohol usage. For example, Rolleston (1927) gives an account of
alcohol usage in ancient Greece and Rome; Feldman (1927) adds information on alcohol in ancient jewish
literature, citing a Talmud proverb “When wine comes in, the secret comes out”. Walsh (2000) analyzes
social drinking in biblical tales, noting that alcohol “increased intimacy” and that “[w]ith heavy drinking
comes heightened trust as well as a consequent increased risk of its betrayal”.
2For example, in an experiment Higgins and Stitzer (1988) found that “[a]lcohol produced a significant
dose-dependent increase in total speech”, which was independent of a social context, which suggests that it
is not the social context which increases talkativeness but alcohol itself.
3This is obviously a problem for those who choose to abstain for other reasons. Paton-Simpson (2001)
analyzes norms that govern minimum levels of consumption in social settings. In particular, he finds
that non-drinkers frequently encounter hostility in response to their deviance, which ranges from subtle
nonverbal cues to threats of physical force.
4effects, iii) allow a gradual degree of loss of control which can be easily observed and
reciprocated by others. Alcohol satisfies these requirements.
If it is efficient for a society to employ a universal, exclusive technology, then it is
efficient to coordinate on one drug. Laws or social norms can then be used to enforce the
u s eo fo n l yo n et e c h n o l o gyt h a ti sw e l ls u i t e df o rt h ep u r p o s e .Th i sc a nh e l pt oe x p l a i n
why alcohol is legal in many countries, whereas other drugs which are just as harmful or
even less harmful from a medically point of view are illegal.4




strategic improvement of the informational content of a noisy exogenous signal (similar
to the one used in Frank 1987).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a simple example of a
g a m eo ft r u s ti nw h i c ht r u s t w o r t h yp l a y e r se m p l o yad r u gt or e v e a lt h e i rt y p e .S e c t i o n3
introduces a more detailed model with a noisy exogenous signal. Section 4 analyzes the
model when the noisy signal is normally distributed. It is shown that both separating and
pooling equilibria can arise. In a separating equilibrium, only the trustworthy types con-
sume the drug. The pooling equilibrium differs from usual pooling equilibria considered
in the literature on asymmetric information: Both types of players consume the same
amount of the drug, but this behavior is nonetheless informative. Long run evolutionary
stable equilibria of type distributions are considered. Section 5 discusses the results of the
model and possible extensions. Section 6 concludes.
2 a simple example
To start with a simple example, assume that two players 1 and 2 play a game of trust
depicted in Figure 1.5 The dotted line indicated the information set of player 1, i.e. he
does not know at which node he is. Player 2 can be either of two types θi, i ∈{ L,H},
where θL can be interpreted as the non-trustworthy type and θH as the trustworthy type.
The probability that player 2 is trustworthy is Prob(θH)=λ.Th ei d e ai st h a tap l a y e r
of type θH will suffer a (subjective) disutility from not rewarding another person’s trust
in him, whereas a player of type θL will not experience such emotions and benefit from
exploiting player 1’s trust.
P l a y e r1w i l lc h o o s eas t r a t e g yt1 ∈{ t,nt} (trust or not trust), player 2 will choose a
strategy t2 ∈{ c,nc} (cooperate or not cooperate). If the type of player 2 were observable
to player 1, the unique (subgame perfect) equilibrium of this game were the choice of nc
b y2a n dntb y1i fp l a y e r2i sn o tt r u s t w o r t h y ,a n dt h ec h o i c eo fcb y2a n dtb y1i fp l a y e r
2i st r u s t w o r t h y .B e c a u s et h et y p eo fp l a y e r2i sn o to b s e rv a b l eb yp l a y e r1 ,t h e( p e r f e c t
B a y e s i a n )e q u i l i b r i u ms t r a t e g yf o rp l a y e r1i st op l a yti fλ > 2 ⁄ 3a n dt op l a ynti fλ < 2⁄3.
4See for instance Nutt et al. (2007). By the authors’ assessment of harm, alcohol ranks higher than
cannabis, LSD, and ecstasy, and many other illegal drugs.
5For one-shot experiments with this game structure see, for example, Berg et al. (1995) and Bolle (1998).






















Figure 1: Ag a m eo ft r u s t .P a y o ffo fp l a y e ri i sg i v e nb yt h eit he l e m e n to ft h ep a y o ffv e c t o r .
Supposethat λ < 2⁄3.Ifplayer2isoftypeθH,hecouldpotentiallybenefitfromcredibly
revealing his type to player 1. Suppose before the game is played, the two players have the
opportunity to engage in an informal conversation accompanied by drug consumption.
Both players know from experience that if a player consumes an amount of at least d then
his type θ w i l lb er e v e a l e d .S u p p o s et h ec o s to ft h i sd r u gc o n s u m p t i o ni sa l s od.Th e n
if d ∈( 0,1), player 2 of type θH will consume an amount of d and reveal his type; the
equilibrium payoff vector in the game will then be (1,1−d). If player 2 were of type θL he
would prefer not to incur the costs of the consumption, as he has nothing to gain from it.
3 an illustrative model
3.1 Preliminaries
For this section and the next, we will interpret the drug as “alcohol” and refer to “drug
consumption” as “drinking”. Consider the following game Γ:
There are N ≥ 2 players, where N is a multiple of two. Players are of type θi, i ∈{ L,H}.
1. Stage Nature assigns each player a type θ,w h e r eProb(θH)=λ with λ ∈[ 0,1]. Players
know their own type and they know λ, but do not know the type of any other player.
2. Stage Th ep l a y e r ss i m u l t a n e o u s l yd e c i d ew h i c ha m o u n td ≥ 0 of alcohol they want to
consume. The consumption and the successive alcohol-induced behavior is observable
by all. The cost of the consumption is the same for both types: c(d)≥0,wi t hc(0)=0,
c′ > 0 and c′′ > 0
3. Stage Every player is randomly matched with another player, with one randomly chosen











Figure 2: Ag a m eo ft r u s t ;p a r to ft h eg a m eΓ. The parameters τj > 0, j ∈{ 1,2},a r et h ep a y o ff so fp l a y e r
1 and 2 when player 2 cooperates after player 1 trusted him; −β1 < 0 is the payoff of player 1 when his
t r u s ti sa b u s e d ;βi
2 is the payoff of player 2, type θi,w h e np l a y e r2a b u s e st h et r u s to fp l a y e r1 .W eh a v e
βL
2 > τ2 > βH
2 , i.e. a trustworthy player 2 (type θH) prefers cooperation wheras a non-trustworthy player 2
(type θL) prefers to abuse the trust.
p l a y e r sh a v ee q u a lc h a n c e st ob e“ p l a y e r1 ”o r“ p l a y e r2 ” .Th ep l a y e r sk n o wt h e i rl a b e l s .
Th eg a m eo ft r u s ta sd e p i c t e di nF i g u r e2i sp l a y e d ,w i t hmin{τ1,τ2,β1}>0 and
βL
2 > τ2 > βH
2 .
Note that the players’ types are assigned independently, i.e. a player cannot conclude
t h a tg i v e nh i so w nt y p e ,t h ep r o b a b i l i t yo fb e i n gm a t c h e dw i t hap l a y e ro ft y p eH is
different from λ.
The players (involuntarily) emit a noisy signal s ∈ R. The signal is drawn from a
distribution function Fi(s ∣ di) with associated probability density function f i(s ∣ di),
where i ∈{ L,H} and di is the alcohol consumption of type θi. To distinguish the noisy
signal s from the endogenous signaling by drinking (see below), we will always refer to
s as the “noisy signal”. For d = dL = dH, the noisy signal is informative about a player’s
type in the sense that the higher the noisy signal the more likely it is that it was drawn
from f H(s ∣ d):
Assumption 1. The two probability density functions satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio
property:F o ra n ys b > sa,w eh a v e
f H(sb ∣ d)
f L(sb ∣ d)
≥
f H(sa ∣ d)
f L(sa ∣ d)
.
Player 2 of type θL w i l ln o tc o o p e r a t ei nt h eg a m eo ft r u s tb e c a u s eβL
2 > τ2,w h e r e a s
player 2 of type θH will cooperate because τ2 > βH
2 . Given player 1’s payoff structure,
p l a y e r1w i l lw a n tt ot r u s tap l a y e ro ft y p eθH and distrust a player of type θL. This is
summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If types are observable, the subgame perfect equilibrium of the subgame of trust
in Γ i s( nt, nc)i fp l a y e r2i so ft y p eθ L a n d( t, c)i fp l a y e r2i so ft y p eθ H.
7Let qi = q(θi,⋅), i ∈{ L,H}, denote the probability that a player 2 of type θi is trusted
at stage 3 of the game Γ (the subgame of trust). The equilibrium values for qi will be
d e r i v e di nt h en e x ts e c t i o n .Th ee x p e c t e du t i l i t yo fp l a y e r1a ts t a g e3i s
E[U1(d)] = λq H τ1 −(1− λ)qL β1 −c(d), (1)
where c(d) i st h ec o s to fp l a y e r1f r o md r i n k i n ga ts t a g e2 .Th ee x p e c t e du t i l i t yf o rp l a y e r
2 for the two different types at stage 3 is
E[U2(θL,d)] = qL βL
2 −c(d), (2)
E[U2(θH,d)] = qH τ2 −c(d). (3)
Th ee x p e c t e du t i l i t yo fap l a y e ra ts t a g e1i st h e n
E[U(θL,d)] = 1⁄2E[U1(d)]+ 1⁄2E[U2(θL,d)], (4)
E[U(θH,d)] = 1⁄2E[U1(d)]+ 1⁄2E[U2(θH,d)], (5)
b e c a u s ep l a y e r sa r el a b e l e d“ p l a y e r1 ”o r“ p l a y e r2 ”w i t he q u a lp r o b a b i l i t y .
3.2 Equilibria
Only pure-strategy equilibria are considered, so a strategy at stage 2 of Γ i sam a p p i n g
between types and alcohol consumption. Let D = R+ be the strategy space at stage 2, and
di be the strategy (alcohol consumption) of type θi.L e td =( dL,dH) denote the strategy
vector of the two types. Let the function ωi = ω(θi ∣ s,d)∈[ 0,1] represent the belief of
ap l a y e rt h a tt h eo t h e rp l a y e rh ei sm a t c h e dw i t ha ts t a g e3i so ft y p eθi,g i v e nt h en o i s y
signal s and the strategies d.6 Let t1 =( tL
1 ,tH
1 )∈{ t,nt}2 and t2 =( tL
2,tH
2 )∈{ c,nc}2








2 −c(di) if ti
2 = nc






V(θH,dL,dH)∶ =1⁄2 q(θH,d)τ2 −c(dH). (8)
Definition1. Apure-strategyperfectBayesianequilibrium(PBE)isgivenbytype-contingent
strategy profiles d =( dL,dH), t1 =( tL
1 ,tH
1 ),a n dt2 =( tL
2,tH





2 ) for all d′ ∈
D,
6In a slight abuse of notation, we will also write ω(θi ∣ s,dL,dH) and q(θi,dL,dH).
8ii) for all d ∈ D, ω(θi ∣ s,dL,dH) is such that if {θi ∣ di = d}≠∅then
ω(θi ∣ s,d)=
λfi(s ∣ di)
λfi(s ∣ di)+I(d)[1− λ] fj(s ∣ dj)
, (9)





1 if dL = dH
0 if dL ≠ dH,
iii) strategy ti
1,i∈{ L,H},i so p t i m a lg i v e nt h eb e l i e fω ,a n d
iv) strategy ti
2, i ∈{ L,H}, is optimal given the strategy of the other player and the belief
ω.
I tc a nb ee a s i l ys e e nt h a tc o n d i t i o ni vo n l yd e p e n d so nt h et y p eo fp l a y e r ;i na n y
equilibrium, we must have t2 =( c,nc).
The belief function ω(θi ∣ s,d) is the same for both player types and denotes the
player’s conditional probability that the other player’s type he is matched with at stage 3
o fΓi sθi (see e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), pp. 331–333).
We call an equilibrium a pooling equilibrium if both types choose the same strategy
(i.e. dL = dH), and a separating equilibrium if the two types choose different strategies
(i.e. dL ≠ dH).
Given the noisy signal s and the payoffs, player 1 will trust player 2 if his expected
p a y o fff r o mt r u s t i n gi sn o n - n e g a t i v e ,i . e .i sa tl e a s ta sh i g ha st h ep a y o fff r o mn o tt r u s t i n g .
In equilibrium the expected payoff needs to be based on the belief ω of player 1. Player 1
will therefore trust if
ω(θH ∣ s,d)τ1 −ω(θL ∣ s,d)β1 ≥ 0, (10)
which is equivalent to
f H(x ∣ d)








if dL = dH = d because ω(θL ∣ s,d)=1−ω(θH ∣ s,d).
Wecannowderivethevaluesfor q(θi,d)inequilibrium. Theprobabilitythataplayer





Note that β1/[β1 +τ1]<1 so that when dL ≠ dH we have with ω(θH ∣ s,dL,dH)=1 that
q(θH,dL,dH)=1, and similarly q(θL,dL,dH)=0.L e ts∗ be the value of s that solves





1−FH(s∗ ∣ d) if dH = dL = d






1−FL(s∗ ∣ d) if dH = dL = d
0i f dH ≠ dL.
(14)
Therefore, if the two types θL and θH choose different amounts of alcohol dL and dH,
then player 1 will be able to perfectly distinguish the two types. Together with Lemma 1
this leads to the following observations:
Lemma 2. In any separating equilibrium of Γ, the equilibrium of the subgame of trust is
(ti
1,tL
2) =( nt, nc)i fp l a y e r2i so ft y p eθ L and (ti
1,tH
2 ) =( t, c)i fp l a y e r2i so ft y p eθ H.
Lemma 3. In any separating equilibrium of Γ p l a y e r so ft y p eθ L will choose d = 0.
Proof Lemma2impliesthatplayer2oftypeθL willhaveanequilibriumpayoffof0−c(d).
With c(0)=0a n dc′ > 0, his optimal amount of alcohol is d = 0.
4 equilibria with a normally distributed signal
F o rf u r t h e re q u i l i b r i u ma n a l y s i si ti sa s s u m e dt h a tt h en o i s ys i g n a ls is drawn from a
normal distribution with mean μi, i ∈{ L,H}, and standard deviation σ(d)=σL(d)=
σH(d). Without loss of generality, we can set μL to zero. The standard deviation is
assumedtodecreaseind,i.e. σ′(d)<0. Thedistributionobviouslysatisfiesthemonotone
likelihood ratio property (Assumption 1). We record the following lemma:
Lemma 4. The parameter λ enters the function q(θi,d) via the belief function. Both
q(θL,d) and q(θH,d) vary continuously in λ and strictly increase in λ for λ ∈( 0,1).
Proof See appendix.
4.1 Drinking as a Binary Choice
Suppose that the strategy space is given by D ={ 0,1}, i.e. a player can only choose
between not drinking and drinking an amount of one unit. Let c = c(1) denote the costs





1−ΦμH,σ(d)2(s∗(d)) if dL = dH = d






1−Φ0,σ(d)2(s∗(d)) if dL = dH = d
0i f dL ≠ dH,
where Φ denotes the normal distribution function and s∗(d) is the threshold value of
t h en o i s ys i g n a ln e e d e df o rp l a y e r2t ob et r u s t e db yp l a y e r1 .
10For λ = 0 no player will be trusted, and for λ = 1 all players will be trusted. For these
c a s e sw ew i l lh a v ed = 0 given consistent beliefs. Besides these two cases, there are three
types of equilibria to be considered: A seperating equilibrium in which type θL refrains
from drinking wheras type θH drinks an amount of one unit; a pooling equilibrium in
which both types drink an amount of one unit, and a pooling equilibrium in which both
t y p e sa b s t a i n .A si tt u r n so u t ,a l lt y p e so fe q u i l i b r i ac a na r i s e .
Proposition 1. All three equilibrium types (separating, pooling with and without drinking)
can arise, given suitable parameter values. In particular, there exist parameter values β, τ,
c, μ, σ andthresholds0 < λ < ¯ λ < 1 such that
(i) for λ ∈( 0,λ), there exist only separating equilibria;
(ii) for λ = λ, there exist only a separating and a pooling equilibrium with drinking;
(iii) for λ ∈( λ, ¯ λ), there exist only pooling equilibria with drinking;
(iv) for λ = ¯ λ, there exist only pooling equilibria with and without drinking;
(v) for λ ∈(¯ λ,1], there exist only pooling equilibria without drinking.
Proof Without loss of generality, we can normalize the costs of drinking to unity (c = 1)
and focus on the the payoffs τ and β.N o t et h a tw i t hc = 1 we must have τi > 2 to ensure
t h a tn o td r i n k i n gi sn o tad o m i n a n ts t r a t e g y .
(i): Three conditions need to be satisfied. They all regard the payoff of player 2 at stage
3o ft h eg a m eΓ .
1. Th ep a y o ffo ft y p eθH from separation has to be greater than the payoff of θH from
pooling with drinking. This condition will always be satisfied for c > 0,a sc a nb ee a s i l y
checked.
2. Th ep a y o ffo ft y p eθH from separation has to be greater than the payoff of θH from
pooling without drinking, i.e.
1⁄2 τ2 −c > 1⁄2 q(θH,0,0)τ2.
3. Th ep a y o ffo ft y p eθL from pooling with drinking has to be less than zero, which
is the payoff of type θL for separation, i.e.
1⁄2 q(θL,1,1)βL
2 −c < 0.
Because q(θi,⋅) is strictly increasing as a function of λ (Lemma 4), for condition 2 it
suffices to show that the λ∗ which solves 1⁄2 τ2[1−q(θH,0,0)] = c is such that λ∗ ∈( 0,1).
The explicit solution for λ∗ is given in the appendix; it is shown that we have indeed
0 < λ < 1. For condition 3, it suffices to show that the λ† which solves 1⁄2 q(θL,1,1)βL
2 = c
is such that λ† ∈( 0,1), which is also shown in the appendix. Furthermore, it is shown
that λ† > λ∗ if βL
2/τ2 is large enough, and we let λ ∶= λ∗.
(ii): For λ = λ players of type θL are indifferent between drinking and not drinking.
Players of type θH will drink in any case if λ† > λ∗.
(iii): Two conditions need to be satisfied. They both regard the payoff of player 2 at
s t a g e3o ft h eg a m eΓ .
111. The payoff of type θH from a pooling situation with drinking has to be greater
than the payoff of θH f r o map o o l i n gs i t u a t i o nw i t h o u td r i n k i n g,i . e .
1⁄2 q(θH,1,1)τ2 −c > 1⁄2 q(θH,0,0)τ2. (15)
2. Th ep a y o ffo ft y p eθL from a pooling situation with drinking has to be positive, i.e.
1⁄2 q(θL,1,1)βL
2 −c > 0. (16)
Forcondition1itissufficientthatthe λ′ thatsolves 1⁄2 τ2[q(θH,1,1)−q(θH,0,0)] = c
is greater than λ and that q(θH,1,1)>q(θH,0,0) for λ ∈( 0,λ′). This is shown in the
appendix. Let ¯ λ ∶= λ′.Condition2issa tisisfiedwhenλ < ¯ λ asseparationisnotsustainable
for λ > λ (see proof of i).
(iv): For λ = ¯ λ, type θL imitates and type θH is indifferent between drinking and not
drinking because q(θH,1,1)=q(θH,0,0).
(v): If ¯ λ < 1 (shown in the appendix), then for λ ∈( ¯ λ,1) the payoff from a pooling
equilibrium without drinking will be higher than the payoff from a pooling equilibrium
without drinking for type θH.F o rλ < ¯ λ, separation is not sustainable (see proof of iii).
The three types of equilibria are depicted in Figure 3. The figure shows the payoff
functions for type θL with drinking and for type θH with and without drinking. For low
λ the payoff of type θL is negative if he decides to drink. Type θL will therefore not drink,
and separation is sustainable – type θH will earn a high payoff of τ2 −c.A sλ increases
above the threshold λ the payoff of type θL in a pooling situation is positive. Type θL will
therefore drink (i.e. he will imitate type θH) a n ds e p a r a t i o ni sn ol o n g e rs u s t a i n a b l e .F o r
λ > λ type θH will compare his payoff from drinking with the payoff from abstaining.
For λ ∈( λ, ¯ λ] the payoff from drinking is higher than from abstaining. Type θH will
therefore drink and type θL will imitate θH by drinking as well. As λ increases above the
threshold ¯ λ type θH will abstain and type θL will imitate θH by abstaining as well.
4.2 Continuous Choice
Suppose now that drinking is a continuous choice, i.e. D = R+. We demonstrate by
examples that all three types of equilibria can exist. Figure 4 shows indifference curves
for type θH for the payoff from pooling, i.e. all combinations of λ and d which yield the
same payoff. For any given λ the optimal amount of alcohol d i sa tt h ep o i n to nav e r t i c a l
line through the point (λ,0) at which the indifference curve is just tangent to that line. A
curve through all these points is depicted; it shows the optimal d in a pooling situation
for all λ.7
Figure 5 shows the combination of all λ and d at which type θL is indifferent between
drinking and abstaining, given that type θH drinks. For all combinations of λ and d on or
a b o v et h i sc u rv es e p a r a t i o nc a nb es u s t a i n e d–t h es h a d e da r e as h o w sa l lc o m b i n a t i o n so f
7Thecurveshowingtheoptimald isdiscontinuousatonepointbecauseforhighλq(θH,d)isdecreasing

















Figure 3: Three possible equilibrium types (example with β1 = βL
2 = 2, τ1 = τ2 = 1, μH = 1, σ(1)=1⁄2,
σ(0)=11⁄10, c = 7⁄100).
V(θH,d,d)=const.






Figure 4: The d which maximizes payoff for type θH in a pooling situation for given λ and indifference
curves (example with β1 = 2, βL




V(θH,d,0)=max ˜ d V(θH, ˜ d, ˜ d)







Separating d > 0 d = 0
Pooling
Figure 5: Three possible equilibrium types (example with β1 = 2, βL




λ and d f o rw h i c ht h ep a y o ffo ft y p eθL of pooling with drinking is negative. The second
c u rv es h o w st h ec o m b i n a t i o n so fλ and d at which, given λ, type θH receives the same
payoff from separation and pooling assuming that he chooses the optimal d for pooling.
Below this curve his payoff from separation exceeds the payoff from pooling. As long as
t h i sc u r v ei si nt h es h a d e da r e a ,t h ep a y o fff r o ms e p a r a t i o ni sh i g h e rt h a nt h a to fp o o l i n g
for type θH, and separation is sustainable. Therefore, for low λ, type θH will choose a
d on the curve representing V(θL,0,0)=0 and we have a separating equilibrium. For
higher λ,s e p a r a t i o ni sn o ts u s t a i n a b l ea n dt y p eθH will choose the optimal d for pooling
a n dw i l lb ei m i t a t e db yt y p eθL.
Figures 6 and 7 also illustrate a separating and a pooling equilibrium. Here the payoff
ofpla yer2a tstage3ofΓ isshownfortwodifferentvaluesof λ. Figure6showsaseparating
equilibrium with a low λ:A tt h ev a l u eo fd a tw h i c ht h ep a y o ffo ft y p eθL is zero, the
p a y o ffo ft y p eθH from separating is higher than the maximal payoff type θH can achieve
with pooling. Figure 7 illustrates the opposite case.
4.3 The Type Distribution in a Long Run Equilibrium
In a similar model without endogenous signaling but noisy exogenous signals, Frank
(1987) investigates the equilibrium proportion of cooperative and non-cooperative types
in a population. In an equilibrium in which both types exist, the expected payoff of the








Figure6: Aseparatingequilibrium(examplewith λ = 55⁄100, β1 = βL











Figure 7: A pooling equilibrium (example with λ = 75⁄100, β1 = βL














Figure 8: Expected payoffs for the two types (example with β1 = βL
2 = 2, τ1 = τ2 = 1, μH = 1, σ = 9⁄10).
worse than other types. If drinking is not an option, then in the model presented in
this paper the equilibrium fraction of trustworthy types is given by the λ∗ that solves
q(θH,0,0)/q(θL,0,0)=β2/τ2. For the equilibrium to be (evolutionarily) stable the
payoff function of type θL has to intersect the payoff function of type θH from below.
Figure 8 depicts such an equilibrium.
The mechanism which leads to the equilibrium value of λ is not explicitly modelled
in Frank (1987). Without drinking as an endogenous signal it is plausible to assume an
evolutionary process guided by natural selection. With drinking, cultural transmission
and imitation during socialization in early years appears to be better suited as a selection
mechanism.
Friedman and Singh (2009) introduce the notion of evolutionarily stable perfect
Bayesian equilibrium, which is also employed in a model on social trust in Ahn and
Esarey (2008). For simplicity, we refer to Lemma 2 and omit the strategies of the subgame
o ft r u s ta ts t a g e3o fΓ.F o rat y p ed i s t r i b u t i o nλ ∈[ 0,1], let PBE(λ) denote the PBE of the
game, i.e. a pair (d,ω) that satisfies Definition 1.
Definition 2. An evolutionarily stable perfect Bayesian equilibrium (EPBE) is a PBE in
which both trustworthy and non-trustworthy types earn the same payoffs or only one
type remains in the population and the other type cannot enter the poulation without
having a lower payoff than the other type. More formally, an evolutionarily stable perfect
Bayesian equilibrium is given by a type-contingent strategy profile d =( dL,dH),b e l i e f s
ω(θi ∣ s,dL,dH),a n dλ∈[ 0,1] such that
i) (d,ω)∈PBE(λ) and
ii) V(θL,d ∣ λ)≥V(θH,d ∣ λ) and V(θH,d ∣ λ)≥V(θL,d ∣ λ).
Consider drinking as a binary choice. Let λ and ¯ λ denote the threshold values for λ














(b) A pooling equilibrium with drinking
Figure 9: Pooling equilibrium without drinking: β1 = βL
2 = 2, τ1 = τ2 = 1, μH = 1, σ(0)=1, σ(1)=65⁄100,
c = 7⁄100. Pooling equilibrium with drinking: β1 = 2, βL
2 = 5, τ1 = τ2 = 1, μH = 1, σ(0)=1, σ(1)=7⁄10,
c = 5⁄100.
equilibrium values for d,i st h e n
Veq(θL ∣ λ)=
⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪
⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0i f λ ∈[ 0,λ]
V(θL,1,1) if V(θL,1,1)∈( λ, ¯ λ]
V(θL,0,0) if V(θL,1,1)∈(¯ λ,1]
(17)
Veq(θH ∣ λ)=
⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪
⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
V(θH,0,1) if λ ∈[ 0,λ]
V(θH,1,1) if V(θL,1,1)∈( λ, ¯ λ]
V(θH,0,0) if V(θL,1,1)∈(¯ λ,1],
(18)
w h e r ei ti sa s s u m e dt h a ta tλ the equilibrium is separating and at ¯ λ the equilibrium is
pooling with drinking. Assuming that both types can survive, the evolutionarily stable
type distribution is given by the λ that solves Veq(θL ∣ λ)=Veq(θH ∣ λ). Figure 9
shows two examples, illustrating that pooling equilibria with and without drinking can
arise. However, a separating equilibrium cannot be evolutionary stable: in a separating
equilibrium, the payoff of the non-trustworthy types at stage 3 of the game Γ is zero, while
t h ep a y o ffo ft h et r u s t w o r t h yt y p e si sp o s i t i v e .Th e r e f o r et h et r u s t w o r t h yt y p e sw i l lt h r i v e
until λ is high enough to render seperation impossible.
ItshouldalsobenotedthatanEPBEinpurestrategiesmaynotexistatall,asillustrated
in Figure 10. The discontinuity of the function Veq(θL ∣ λ) i sd u et ot h ea b r u p tc h a n g e
from drinking to non-drinking. In this case we may observe cyclic patterns of pooling
equilibria with and without drinking (see also Section 5).
5 discussion and possible extensions
5.1 Separating vs. Pooling Equilibria
B o t hs e p a r a t i n ga n dp o o l i n ge q u i l i b r i ac a na r i s ei nt h em o d e lp r e s e n t e di nS e c t i o n3 .







Figure 10: An equilibrium may not exist (example with β1 = 2, βL
2 = 3, τ1 = τ2 = 1, μH = 1, σ(0)=9⁄10,
σ(1)=1⁄2, c = 6⁄100).
appear to be likely that those who do remain abstinent are not trustworthy. Hupkens
et al. (1993) find that within the European Community the average percentage of alcohol
abstainers is 10.8% for men and 22.3% for women; see Bloomfield et al. (2003) for a recent
survey of international comparisons. The pooling situation therefore appears to be a
more realistic description of reality. This is in accordance with the finding that separating
equilibria are not evolutionarily stable.
Furthermore, there is some support of the hypothesis of cyclic patterns in social
drinking due to the non-existence of an evolutionarily stable equilibrium, as wave-like
variations in alcohol consumption are indeed observed (see Skog 1986).
5.2 Countersignaling
Feltovich et al. (2002) introduce the notion of countersignaling:I nam o d e lw i t ha n
exogeneous noisy signal and at least three different types the highest types might choose
to not invest into an endogeneous signal. The intuition is that the highest types have
reasons to be confident that their noisy signal identifies them as high types; investing into
the endogeneous signal would pool them with the medium types. Non-drinkers who are
otherwise easily recognized as trustworthy might take consolation in the idea that they
are countersignaling.
5.3 Competing Drugs
Suppose that to correctly interpret drug-induced behavior it requires some knowledge
about the particular technology employed by the players which is obtained due to social-
ization and experimentation. If players can only obtain knowledge about one drug, then
inefficiency will arise if many different drugs are used by different players. Suppose two
players who have “specialized” in different drugs are matched at state 2 of the game. These
players will not be able to reveal any information about themselves. This will benefit
the types who are not trustworthy at the expense of those who are trustworthy. If the
trustworthy types are the majority, society may be able to enforce, via laws or norms, the
u s eo fas i n g l ed r u g .
185.4 Exploitation and Reciprocity
In the model in Section 3 only trustworthiness was analyzed. If intoxication of one player
can by exploited by another player, players can also signal trust by using the drug. It is
also possible that the ability of player i to exploit the intoxicated player j decreases with
player i’s own intoxication. In that case using the drug together and simultaneously can
decrease the risk of being exploited for both players. In the case of alcohol, this can be
easilyachievedbytakingonesipatatimeandwaitingfortheotherplayertofollowinsuit.
Staying only one sip ahead of the other player does not lead to a high risk of exploitation.
5.5 Religion and Alcohol
There is evidence that religion, in particular participation in religious rituals, can signal
trustworthiness or, more generally, prosocial preferences. Sosis (2003) provides a simple
graphical model of this idea. Ruffle and Sosis (2007) test the hypothesis with experi-
ments conducted in secular and religious kibbutzim; their results confirm the hypothesis,
a l t h o u g ht h ea l t e r n a t i v eh y p o t h e s i st h a ti ti sr e l i g i o u sp a r t i c i p a t i o np e rs et h a tc a u s e s
prosociality could not be rejected. The hypothesis that religiosity is useful as a signal for
trustworthiness was directly tested by Tan and Vogel (2008) in a laboratory experiment;
the authors find convincing evidence in support of the hypothesis. See Norenzayan and
Shariff (2008) for a recent survey of the research in this field.
Many religions recommend or require abstinence from drugs; the most prominent
example with regard to alcohol (or, more exactly, khamr)i sI s l a m . 8 Patock-Peckham
et al. (1998) find that college students without religious affiliation report higher levels of
drinking frequency and quantity than non-religious students; the difference exists also
f o rp e r c e i v e dd r i n k i n gn o r m s .L o r c ha n dH u g h e s( 1 9 8 5 )fi n dt h a tr e l i g i o ni sn o tas t r o n g
p r e d i c t o ro fd r u gu s eo fy o u n gp e o p l ei ng e n e r a l ,b u tt h e yd ofi n dt h a tr e l i g i o ni ss t r o n g l y
related to alcohol use, and that fundamentalists have the lowest percentages of drug use
in general.
If signaling of trustworthiness is an important aspect of both religion and moderate
alcohol consumption, then religion and alcohol are to some extent substitutes. If it
is the signaling aspect of religion that contributes to the stability of religious groups,
religious leaders who are concerned about the success and stability of their religion have
an incentive to discourage the use of alcohol or similar technologies.
6 conclusion
This paper introduced an illustrative model to analyze social drug consumption and to
propose that one reason for this phenomenom can be found in information economics.
Alcohol seems to be particularly well suited as it does not only faciliate social interaction
and type revelations, but is also not addictive for moderate consumption, has mostly
short term effects, and allows a gradual degree of loss of control which can be easily
observed and reciprocated by others. The model is also novel from a more technical point
8See Michalak and Trocki (2006) and Deuraseh (2003) for an overview.
19of view, as we modeled the strategic improvement of the informational content of a noisy
exogenous signal.
The model presented in this paper includes a noisy signal about personality types.
Drinking has an impact on the distribution of the signal; specifically, it was assumed
that drinking reduces the standard deviation of the noisy signal. It was shown that
fully separating equilibria exist in populations with large fractions of trustworthy types.
Poolingequilibriawithandwithoutdrinkingcanexistinpopulationswithsmallfractions











The error function is denoted erf(x) and the complementary error function is denoted
erfc(x)=1−erf(x). We denote qL = q(θL,d) and qH = q(θH,d).W eh a v e



















2π(1− λ)λμ H ;
it is easy to check that this expression is positive except for the limiting cases of λ → 0
and λ → 1, where the expression is zero. The proof for qL works analogously.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 The λ∗ which solves 1⁄2 τ2[1−q(θH,0,0)] = c is




























2 we have λ† ∈( 0,1).
































For the left hand side to be positive, it suffices that βL
2 > 4 and (2βL
2)/(βL
2 −2)>τ2 > 2.
The right hand side can be arbitrarily close to zero.




which given the restrictions on a the parameters is equivalent to 0 < λ < λ◇ where






Note that q(θH,1,1)>q(θH,0,0) is sufficient for 1⁄2 q(θH,1,1)τ2 −c > 1⁄2 q(θH,0,0)τ2
because τ2 can be arbitrarily large. What remains to be shown is ¯ λ < λ◇, which given the







The right hand side is positive, whereas erfc−1(2−[4c/τ2]) = 0 for τ2 = 4 and c = 1 and
decreases in τ2. Finally, λ◇ < 1i so b v i o u s .
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